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Abstract
The debate on economic “globalization” suggests that the blurring of territorial
boundaries shifts the power relations between nation-states and domestic market
constituencies in favour of the latter. States have lost autonomy since policies are
increasingly formulated in supranational or global arenas. Market actors may
use their wider choice of geographic location in order to lobby for low regulated
market environments. The paper seeks to differentiate this common view consid-
erably. It argues that economic internationalization weakens the capacity of do-
mestic market actors to engage in self-binding agreements that formerly had
solved regulatory problems. Networks of interstate collaboration in turn lack the
ability to monitor and enforce negotiated agreements. Both developments im-
pose new duties of market supervision on the nation-state. Empirical reference is
drawn from the stock exchange sector that went through a process of transfor-
mation which has led to an enhanced role of the nation-state in the model of sec-
toral governance.
Zusammenfassung
Die zunehmende “Globalisierung der Ökonomie” scheint das Machtgleichge-
wicht zwischen Politik und Wirtschaft zugunsten der Ökonomie zu verschieben.
Nationalstaaten verlieren an Autonomie, weil Politik zunehmend auf suprana-
tionaler oder globaler Ebene formuliert wird. Marktteilnehmer hingegen nutzen
ihren erweiterten territorialen Aktivitätsspielraum, um staatliche Regulierungen
zu umgehen, die ihre Produktionskosten erhöhen könnten. Der Beitrag will diese
Perspektive differenzieren. Argumentiert wird, daß ökonomische Internationali-
sierung die Fähigkeit zu kollektiver Selbstregulierung der Marktteilnehmer
schwächt. Netzwerken zwischenstaatlicher Kooperation auf der anderen Seite
mangelt es an Kapazitäten, die Einhaltung von Vereinbarungen zu garantieren.
Beide Entwicklungen führen zu neuen Aufgaben der Marktüberwachung für
den Nationalstaat. Als empirisches Fallbeispiel wird der Börsensektor präsen-
tiert, welcher weltweit einen Transformationsprozeß durchlief, aus dem erwei-
terte Aufgaben des Nationalstaates im Modell sektoraler Steuerung hervorgingen.
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1 Introduction
The debate on economic globalization suggests that the blurring of territorial
boundaries shifts the power relationship between nation-states and domestic
market actors in favour of the latter (Cable 1995, Schmidt 1995). States experience
both external and internal challenges to their autonomy. Since they delegate pol-
icy-making powers to supranational or even global arenas, they are less autono-
mous in the formulation and implementation of policies for their constituencies.
Market actors, in turn, are usually seen as the profiteers of economic and political
“deterritorialization.” They are able to combine the opportunities for broadening
their economic sphere with the capacity to circumvent public policies that would
impose regulatory costs on them. Consequently, states lose control of their policy
instruments: they are “hollowed out” internally (Strange 1995). There is perhaps
no other economic sector that fits this scenario better than the financial one.
Driven by changing strategies of finance companies, by deregulatory movements
of national governments and by increasing use of information technology,
worldwide integration of financial, particularly securities, markets has been tak-
ing place since the mid-1970s. Economic integration has been partly facilitated
and partly accompanied by the development of an increasingly dense network of
interstate collaboration in questions of financial regulation. Thus, at the interna-
tional level, nation-states are mere negotiation partners in questions of regulatory
policies, while internally they are “hollowed out” by more mobile and more in-
ternationally based financial capital, which is playing them off against each other.
The argument that is to be developed in this paper will not completely contradict
this scenario. However, it will differentiate it considerably, in particular with re-
spect to the unconditional assumption that finance companies have been
strengthened and the state has been weakened by internationalization. The ar-
gument here is twofold. First, it shows that financial internationalization puts
market actors under increasing pressure to compete and thereby erodes their
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previous capacity for collective action. Thus, market participants are no longer
able to engage in the self-binding agreements that formerly had solved crucial
problems of financial regulation. Second, economic integration has been accom-
panied by growing interstate collaboration in regulatory matters that attempts to
cope with the cross-border risks of financial business. Both developments – the
weakness of financial firms in regulating themselves and the growing importance
of the international system in securities regulation – impose new regulatory du-
ties on the nation-state. Thus, the state “is brought back in” (Evans/Ruesche-
meyer/Skocpol 1985) to the model of sectoral regulation. As “upholder of the
law” the nation-state monitors and enforces the new rules of the global game. The
present paper elaborates this argument through analysis of the stock exchange
sector, particularly in Germany. Traditionally, this sector had been governed by a
well-established mode of self-regulation with the state playing a minor role.
During the 1980s and 1990s, this sector experienced a process of global transfor-
mation which has led to an enhanced role of the nation-state in the system of sec-
toral governance. Apparently, financial internationalization has shifted the do-
mestic balance between private and public governance mechanisms in favour of
the latter.
The following section discusses problems of financial regulation and elaborates
on the preconditions which made the public and/or private provision of collec-
tive goods possible. It is argued that under conditions of open markets the do-
mestic basis for cooperative solutions to regulatory problems is subject to erosion.
The next three sections present the empirical case of the German stock exchange
sector and reveal the causal mechanisms of its transformation. Finally, the argu-
ment for an apparent “revival” of the nation-state is qualified, and problems that
evolve out of new state functions are discussed.
2 Mechanisms of Sectoral Governance and Financial Internationalization
Systems of capitalist production are not simply defined by free markets and pri-
vate property. Market coordination is embedded in a regulatory framework
which, by making it possible to avoid or circumvent problems of collective action,
produces collectively beneficial outcomes. There are market failures of different
types that regulatory structures remedy. Negative externalities arise when the well-
being of a consumer or a firm is directly affected by the actions of another. Bank-
ing failure for example, may cause chain reactions which threaten to harm not
only depositors but also institutions of other economic sectors. Asymmetric infor-
mation between sellers and consumers of economic services about the quality of
products is seen as another failure of the “invisible hand.” For consumers of fi-
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nancial services it is very hard to tell directly whether their broker is offering
honest advice or whether their principal banker maintains adequate margins of
solvency. The better informed professional is very likely to engage in opportun-
istic behaviour and to take advantage of his greater access to information than a
non-insider (see Herring/Litan 1995 and Kay/Vickers 1988 for problems of fi-
nancial regulation).
In the face of these well-known shortcomings in the capacity of markets to pro-
vide collective goods, efforts have been made to develop alternative mechanisms
to meet these demands. The state in particular is usually considered to be the
primary alternative source of social and economic order. Even neo-classical eco-
nomic approaches (see for example the economic approaches of regulation,
Stigler 1975; Peltzman 1976) accept the state as the primary source of law. As the
holder of a “monopoly on the legitimate use of violence” in its own territory it
creates, monitors and enforces regulatory policies vis-à-vis its constituencies.
Nevertheless, failures of public regulation are at least as likely as those of mar-
kets. In response to this, institutionalist approaches dealing with problems of
“industrial order” or “modes of sectoral governance” (i.e. Hollingsworth/Schmitter/
Streeck 1994; Campbell/Hollingsworth/Lindberg 1991) emphasize that self-
regulation of market actors may contribute a further source of social order that
complements or even substitutes for the state. When industrial or financial firms
manage to establish collective, mutually binding agreements, committing them to
maximize joint gains instead of individual ones, these outcomes are known as
”solidaristic,” “categorical” or “club-goods” (Streeck/Schmitter 1985, Buchanan
1965) because they leave at least the payers better off than before (see, for in-
stance, the broad literature on the benefits of interfirm collaboration, Powell 1990,
Powell/Smith-Doerr 1994; Lütz 1993). German banks, for instance, have estab-
lished a collective system of deposit insurance protection, which is carried and
managed by peak banking associations (see Ronge 1979). Stock exchanges oper-
ate an array of self-regulated committees that guard against misbehaviour on the
part of exchange members (Insider Commission, Arbitration Tribunal).
Research on problems of collective action, however, has shown that smaller
groups are organized more easily than larger ones (Olson 1968) and that one can-
not always assume that associations will be capable of effectively representing
the interests of their members. In fact, institutionalist approaches indicate that
self-organized order comes about only under specified conditions, in particular,
when the state retains sufficient strength to ensure that collective entities act in a
broader public interest (Streeck/Schmitter 1985). Moreover, the debate on “neo-
corporatism” has shown that, under certain preconditions, state and private col-
lective actors may engage in mutually advantageous exchange relationships. The
state can help solve collective action problems within important interest associa-
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tions by delegating its authority to legitimately coerce and thus enjoy a public
status. In turn, associations may participate in processes of political decision-
making and implementation. Both sides profit from this arrangement: the state is
able to shift the burden of policy implementation to the side of market actors,
whose participation may lead to greater flexibility and legitimacy of public poli-
cies. Associations or private collective entities, on the other hand, engage in self-
binding agreements, but enjoy considerable autonomy in determining the level of
cost they are willing to bear for the sake of their collective good. Even though
corporatist systems had their shortcomings,1 they were for a long time considered
to be intelligent institutional arrangements allowing the production of collective
goods on the macroecononic or the sectoral level.
With the golden age of macrocorporatism now apparently over, can we assume
that sectoral mixes of public-private governance have also come to an end? There
are good reasons to believe so. The coupling of distinct public and private
mechanisms of social order is only practical if both partners share the same abil-
ity to make autonomous and effectively binding decisions on behalf of their own
constituencies. The nation-state requires the independent capacity to decide which
kind of politics should be imposed on its constituencies. Autonomy in decision-
making is a precondition for the capacity to share it with societal actors. Associa-
tions or other types of collective entities, on the other hand, have to ensure that their
members abide by self-binding agreements and do not free-ride on them. Both of
these preconditions depend on the assumption that the costs and benefits of pub-
lic-private partnerships would be shared among a group of actors demarcated by
territorial borders. Private collective entities need to control the exit-options of
their constituencies in order to be trustworthy negotiation partners. The state, for
its part, needs autonomy in the case of self-organizational failures among its con-
stituent citizens, in order to be able to find and impose collectively binding solutions.
The current debate on the globalization of the economy contends that these condi-
tions are no longer given. Globalization is mostly used as a fashionable, mystic
keyword that indicates the process of blurring boundaries between formerly
separated domestic product and capital markets. In general, it is very doubtful
whether truly global markets are now replacing old and territorially demarcated
ones. Even financial markets and, in particular, securities markets, which are of-
ten considered as the prototypes of the evolving “end of geography” (O’Brien
1992) in financial business, are not “global” in the sense that prices for similar as-
sets are the same across markets. Important differences in trading procedures re-
                                                  
1 Offe has pointed out that only organizationally privileged groups enjoyed the
benefits of corporatist intermediation while less organized interests fell behind, giv-
ing rise to legitimacy deficits (Offe 1984).
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main between markets and only few securities are traded in broad, liquid mar-
kets in more than one country. But even though truly global markets have not yet
materialized, there is little doubt that in recent years both financial and securities
markets have become increasingly internationalized. There is clearly greater in-
terdependence of yields across not only instruments but also financial centres and
in the regulatory frameworks in which market transactions are embedded (OECD
1995b: 16). In other words: the choices and strategies of public and private actors
in financial business are more than ever framed by the opportunities and restric-
tions provided by the global economic and political landscape. The pessimistic
scenario that follows from these developments can be characterized in the follow-
ing way.
Nation-states experience two broad challenges to their autonomy. First, externally,
in more and more policy fields it has become obvious that the state no longer has
the autonomous capacity to formulate and implement policies towards its con-
stituencies. Regulatory policies, for instance, are increasingly formulated in su-
pranational or even global arenas with nation-states cooperating in multi-layered
systems of decision-making. Problems like the degree and level of regulation,
whether regulatory tasks are delegated to private actors or remain in the state’s
jurisdiction, are no longer solved by sovereign decisions, but have become objects
of bi- and multilateral negotiations. Whilst the growth of regulation in the Euro-
pean Union is the most cited example of the growing role of supranational arenas
of decision-making,2 international regimes (Krasner 1983; Kohler-Koch 1989),
with national representatives bargaining about levels and types of regulation,
play crucial roles in policy fields like finance and environmental policy.
Second, internally, the state is said to be “hollowing out” (Strange 1995) since it no
longer has sufficient control of the necessary policy instruments. If market actors
carrying capital, production facilities and jobs increasingly decide to choose the
exit-option in regard to their domestic territory, the effectiveness of national
policies in preventing this is limited. With the dismantling of capital exchange
controls at the end of the 1970s, for instance, the capacity of states to pursue
macroeconomic management strategies has been reduced considerably (Webb
1991; Pauly 1995). Moreover, firms acting as global players may pursue strategies
of regulatory arbitrage, by playing states off against one another and then set-
tling in the one with the least intrusive regulation. The simple fact that there is a
                                                  
2 Majone has shown that it was only in the field of environmental protection that al-
most 200 directives, regulations and decisions were introduced by the European
Commission between 1967 and 1987. With the launching of the Single Market pro-
gram in 1985, several hundreds of regulatory measures were proposed concerning
different policy fields (Majone 1994: 85–86).
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“disjuncture between the formal authority of the state and the spatial reach of
contemporary systems of production and finance” (Held/Mc Grew 1993: 268)
leaves market actors with more bargaining power than before in decisions about
the adequate institutional framework of production and finance.
While the nation-state is obviously restricted in its capacity to impose autono-
mously binding decisions on its constituencies, it is very doubtful that this loss
will be compensated for by a higher degree of self-regulatory capacity among
market actors. Although the governance debate has not yet dealt with this prob-
lem in detail, it is clear that increasing domestic and international pressures in
price and product competition, often initiated or catalysed by the deregulatory or
competition policies of national governments or the European Union, impede col-
lective action at the national level. In sectors most closely tied to the global economy,
market actors will have greater difficulty reaching collectively binding agree-
ments and enforcing them effectively. Global players will prefer the exit-option
from binding pacts at home, particularly if these impose additional costs on pro-
duction processes and products while possibly weakening their competitiveness
abroad. Firms that are still oriented towards the domestic market, however, will
face increasingly smaller profit margins and cut-throat competition. In sum, it is
entirely possible that deterritorialization will lead to a growing heterogeneity of
interests among the members of collective entities. A firm’s willingness to coop-
erate in the provision of collective goods at home now depends increasingly on
its capacity to benefit from the internationalization of markets: potential losers
will tend to stick to collectively binding pacts while territorial boundary spanners
will prefer to exit them. As a consequence of the increasing difficulties of interest
aggregation, collective entities will face predominantly internal pressures of erosion.
Taken together, this pessimistic scenario of a “weak” state and “weak” collective
actors suggests that state-sanctioned self-regulatory governance will be more and
more unlikely in the face of economic and political internationalization. The fol-
lowing section will confront this pessimistic hypothesis with empirical data.
3 The Old Model of Sectoral Governance – Self-Regulated Cartels
Stock exchanges are among the most controversial institutions of the financial
sector. Their opponents have complained about their character as “gambling
places,” seducing unprofessionals to casino-like speculation, while their defend-
ers have emphasized their role as ideal typical markets for capital, where supply
and demand for securities are aggregated and are allocated at optimal prices. To-
day, it is the latter, more “rationalized” view of stock exchanges which dominates
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the scene, although the technical opportunities for speculation have increased
since the 19th century, as have the cases of speculative failures. It is due precisely
to failures of the invisible hand’s operations that stock exchange transactions
have become embedded in a regulatory framework which distinguishes them
from unregulated market arenas such as offshore tax havens or electronic equity
trading via private firm networks. Although in theory formal rules provide for
the proper operation of stock exchanges, it is important to consider the intensity
of regulation or the degree to which rules are set by public law or by market actors
themselves. In fact, one of the most distinct traits of stock exchange regulation
traditionally has been its private, self-regulatory character. The American and the
British systems have long been prototypical examples of this model of self-
regulation (see, for an overview, Stonham 1987; Sobel 1994; Moran 1991, 1994;
Coleman 1994 and 1996). Originating in the 1790s, the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and the London Stock Exchange (LSE) developed essentially as cartels of
stockbrokers or investment houses, banding together by price-fixing (for example
by means of the principle of noncompetitive commission fees for services ren-
dered by members to nonmembers). Somewhat ironically, the “icons” of capital-
ism operated as exclusive clubs, creating high entry barriers to membership while
internally maintaining control over their members.
In Germany, the modern stock exchange developed about 100 years later than in
London or New York, although local fairs, serving as meeting places for the ex-
change of goods, information and securities existed as far back as the 16th and
17th centuries. The institutionalization of the stock exchanges was closely linked
with the incorporation of the merchant class. Organized markets were mostly
implemented by local chambers of commerce and enjoyed the status of public
law bodies. Trading was governed by rules that were embedded within profes-
sional ethics of the merchant business. Internally, the exchanges were governed
by a number of self-regulating committees which dealt, among other things, with
admission to security listings, with fees for equity trading or with disciplinary
procedures when exchange rules were breached (Insider Commission, Court of
Honour, Arbitration Tribunal). It was mostly the “producers” of financial serv-
ices, that is issuers of equities, stockbrokers and, in particular, the large universal
banks, which held the majority of seats in these self-governing committees; indi-
vidual investors had no voice in them.
The severe economic crisis (Gründerkrise) of 1873, followed by the stock market
crash of 1891 – both of which brought severe financial losses to the broader public –
spawned a debate over whether to tighten the mode of sectoral regulation in se-
curities trading by including the state in the supervisory structure. The culture
and practice of self-regulation was vehemently defended by the stock exchange
members, and in the mid-1890s the German provincial governments (Länder) be-
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came their strongest allies. Turf battles over the distribution of regulatory
authority ensued between the federal government and the majority of the mem-
ber governments. Ultimately, the Länder were the winners in this conflict: in 1896
they took over legal supervision of their respective stock exchanges and ap-
pointed “State Commissioners” to oversee the implementation of federal and
state law. However, the Länder restricted themselves to a form of legal supervi-
sion over their respective exchanges and, by granting licences for self-regulation to
private actors, basically practised a politics of non-intervention. This policy was
continued after the Second World War, when eight regional stock exchanges
were re-established and the Stock Exchange Legislation became part of Art. 74 of
the German Basic Law. The regional governments were granted codecision rights
over stock exchange matters which allowed them to bargain in the Federal
Council (Bundesrat) over the approval of new legislation. The Federal govern-
ment, that is, the Ministry of Finance, only played a minor role in this model of
sectoral regulation. The Ministry had to share legislative competences in matters
of capital market and particularly stock exchange legislation with the Länder. The
framework of federal law had no significant provisions for a federal role either in sec-
toral supervision or in the regulation of behavior.
Sectoral self-regulation, tolerated by the federal government, was accompanied, if
not made possible, by cartel-like relations between stock market actors. Firstly, cartel-
like relationships evolved out of the dominant role German universal banks
played in the model of sectoral governance. Unlike their counterparts in Anglo-
Saxon countries, German universal banks were allowed to engage in both com-
mercial and investment banking. Since they were able to fulfill the industry’s
needs for capital either by providing loans or by issuing and trading their clients’
equities, they were the core financial intermediaries in the German financial sys-
tem. However, it is common knowledge that their commercial banking opera-
tions were for a long time the more profitable kind of the two types of business.
Issuing and trading customers’ shares was only a further element of the close re-
lationships between house banks and industry.3 From this followed that capital
markets were underdeveloped and the banks themselves held the majority of in-
dustrial shares in domestic stock markets.4 Between 1982 and 1992, for instance,
the Deutsche Bank alone issued 52% of all newly listed shares on the German
                                                  
3 In fact, researchers into the German economy have been eager to demonstrate that
close, loan-based relations between banks and industry were the core of the German
model of “organized capitalism” (Hilferding 1910) since they guaranteed overall
stability for long-term industrial investment as well as for the economic system as a
whole (Shonfield 1965; Dyson 1986).
4 According to the estimates of financial experts, only 20% of the capital of all German
companies was traded on stock exchanges in 1992 while in Great Britain or in Swit-
zerland the percentage share was about 80% (Die Zeit, November 27, 1992: 23).
Lütz: The Revival of the Nation-State? 13
stock exchanges (Die Zeit, November 27, 1992: 23). Restricted competition for in-
dustrial clients, therefore, was simply the outcome of the banks’ structurally
based position of power in the German financial sector.
Secondly, cartel-like relationships characterized not only the relations between
members of one exchange, but also inter-exchange relations. Like their Anglo-
Saxon counterparts, German exchanges systematically limited competition, but in
Germany this was achieved through the system of German federalism. There
were eight regional exchanges in Germany, with half of them generally trading in
specialized shares of a regional character (Bremen, Hamburg, Berlin, Hanover)
and only the larger exchanges (Frankfurt, Düsseldorf, Munich, Stuttgart) compet-
ing for the most liquid and therefore most attractive “blue chips.”5 Despite obvi-
ous power differentials – Frankfurt alone covered almost 75% of all stock market
trading in 1990 – a stable pattern of collaboration governed inter-exchange rela-
tionships. This was most visible in the internal structure of the Federation of
Stock Exchanges. The Federation was a common working group, founded in
1952, to deal with significant problems associated with rebuilding capital markets
after World War II. Internal decision-making procedures were characterized by
chair rotation and a consensus rule, both of which clearly indicated equality
among the membership. Stable inter-exchange collaboration, however, was the
basis for the survival of the weaker partners of the circle. Part of the circle’s
“unwritten rules,” for example, was that some of the most attractive shares had to
be traded at all exchanges. This, in turn, required large industrial issuers to apply
for trading at all eight sites and pay all the related fees. From the viewpoint of the
smaller trading places, this rule subsidized their further existence and also guar-
anteed that smaller firms, whose equities were unlikely to be traded in Frankfurt,
might use their home exchange to go public. Although the large German banks
were mostly oriented towards Frankfurt, where the largest turnover of the most
liquid shares took place, they nevertheless upheld the regional market structure.
There were basically two reasons for this: first, due to the different sizes of the
regional exchanges, price differentials for certain shares came about that pro-
vided arbitrage opportunities for banks. The second, probably more important,
reason was that, as long as equity dealing played only a minor role in German fi-
nance and as long as banks dealt mostly with domestic and not foreign investors,
they could easily shift the costs for subsidizing their weaker exchange partners to
the customer, i.e. investor, side. As a result, costs for the clearing and settlement
of deals, brokers’ commissions and turnover taxes were higher in Germany than
in other countries. German individual investors, however, did not complain
about this. In fact, they have traditionally preferred bonds, bank deposits or life
                                                  
5 In Germany, the 100 most liquid shares are part of the German share index (the
DAX).
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insurance contracts to riskier investment in equities. Moreover, a far-reaching
pension fund system discouraged the growth of large institutional investors like
insurance companies, pension funds or mutual funds in Germany. Therefore, on
the domestic market, a strong lobby of investors as existed in the United States was
lacking.
Taken together, the German model of sectoral governance resembled self-regulated
cartels embedded in the system of German federalism. Stock market actors and re-
gional governments were joined together by the common interest in defending
their sphere of influence against intervention by the federal state. In particular,
Länder and market actors built strong coalitions against efforts to penetrate the
model of regional self-regulation, through such measures as the incorporation of
regulatory matters into federal law or the establishment of a federal supervisory
agency. The Federal Ministry of Finance, for example, experienced strong resis-
tance from these regional coalitions in the mid-1960s when it tried to raise stan-
dards of investor protection, to criminalize insider trading and introduce further
disclosure rules. The reform was intended to render shareholding more popular
among investors and to build trust in organized capital markets. In the face of
this opposition, the reform initiative ended with only incremental success: the
coalition of market actors and the regional governments proved itself able to
ward off intrusion from the federal government. Since then, a state of friendly co-
existence has characterized the relationship between market actors and the fed-
eral state. As long as the sector was not shaken by crises or by external threats,
the Federal Ministry saw no reason for intervention. Instead, it relied on the ca-
pacities of market actors to handle problems of sectoral regulation by themselves.
For market actors, in particular for German banks, the model of sectoral self-
regulation was a very comfortable one since it provided low regulatory efforts.
Since primarily the universal banks controlled the majority of seats in the self-
regulating committees of the exchanges, in effect the community of producers of
financial services themselves decided on the costs they were willing to take for
the sake of the transparency and openness of their market transactions. Not sur-
prisingly, regulatory standards designed to overcome problems of asymmetric in-
formation between the sellers of equities and investors stayed quite low. Even af-
ter the reform initiative of the Federal Ministry, insider trading was not criminal-
ized nor were disclosure rules allowing transparency over the issuance, registra-
tion and trading of securities established. It was the producers’ own rules that
governed trading activities, and since investors lacked a strong domestic lobby,
they had no other choice than to trust in the functioning of self-regulation.
In sum, an economic cartel of sectoral governance was accompanied by a political
one, and both were based on the same preconditions: on the relative unimpor-
tance of the investor in the stock market, and on the fact that the German big
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universal banks, as the actors who dominated stock market business and also the
politics of sectoral regulation, supported it. We shall see that, at the end of the
1980s, these conditions no longer existed.
4 Mechanisms of Internationalization and Their Implications for
Domestic Actors
Within the last two decades, financial markets have experienced a period of fun-
damental transformation. The nature of the securities business in particular has
turned from a highly regulated, tradition-bound activity somewhat on the fringe
of most financial systems into the primary force changing the financial landscape
of the OECD countries. Two broad structural developments have characterized
this transformation: first, increasing competitive pressures evolving out of the
blurring of domestic market boundaries and a structural change in the finance
sector that favours investment banking over commercial banking; second, in-
creasing interstate collaboration in questions of financial regulation, driven mostly by
the states’ desire to prevent the cross-border spread of risks.
The blurrring of market boundaries has been spurred by the changing strategies
of financial market actors, by the use of information technology to exploit arbi-
trage opportunities on a worldwide scale and by the deregulatory activities of
national governments. Deregulation started with the abolition of exchange con-
trols in the late 1970s. Domestic governments allowed financial innovations to be
traded, lowered access barriers for foreigners to stock exchange membership and
replaced former price cartels by systems of negotiable commissions for brokers
and traders (for an overview see OECD 1995b, Cerny 1993b, Laurence 1996). By
the early 1980s, cross-border flows of capital had reached enormous volumes, and
the issuance and trading of securities on international markets burgeoned (see
table 1).
The transformation of financial markets, however, consists of more than a simple
territorial expansion in activity. Probably the most important structural change is
that an increasing share of financial intermediation is taking place through capi-
tal markets as opposed to bank lending. Banks as the classical financial interme-
diaries are increasingly bypassed by borrowers and put under competitive pres-
sure by institutional investors. Borrowers, especially those who are credit-
worthy, prefer to transform their liabilities into tradable securities since this is a
much cheaper way of raising capital than relying on bank credits. By direct re-
course to investors in the capital market, borrowers tend to replace the interme-
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diary function of banks (= “securitization” of financial relations). Institutional in-
vestors, on the other hand, have turned into the major players on international-
ized securities markets. During the last 15 years, insurance companies, pension
funds or mutual funds have experienced a considerable growth and play an ever-
increasing role as collectors of savings, major owners of publicly held companies
and as investors in securities and other financial assets (see table 2).
Their power is based on the fact that institutional investors are mostly multina-
tional firms which tend to diversify their portfolios internationally and operate
with large blocks of the most liquid shares in the world. Therefore, institutional
investors have gained the potential to take advantage of the differences in costs
and returns across national markets. They choose from among the most innova-
tive, but particularly most price-sensitive, trading places in the world (Rasch
1993: 15–16; Gerke 1995).
Taken together, worldwide structural changes in securities markets have shifted
power from the producer of financial services to the customer, in particular to the
investor. For commercial banks (or universal banks which have traditionally re-
lied more on commercial banking than on the investment business) this is a rela-
tively new experience, given the fact that credit-based relationships are usually
dominated by the creditor. Yet, commercial institutions see themselves increas-
ingly bypassed by the most attractive borrowers and left behind with smaller,
probably less credit-worthy firms. Institutional investors, on the other hand, have
gained bargaining power with regard to transaction costs they are willing to pay
and with regard to the level of protection offered to them.
Table 1 Cross-border Transactions in Bonds and Equitiesa (as % of GDP)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
USA 2.8 4.2 9.3 36.4 92.5
Japan n.a. 1.5 7.0 60.5 118.6
Germany 3.3 5.1 7.5 33.9 57.5
France n.a. n.a. 8.4b 21.4 53.3
Italy n.a. 0.9 1.1 4.0 26.7
UK n.a. n.a. n.a. 367.5 690.1
Canada 5.7 3.3 9.6 26.7 63.8
a Gross purchases and sales of securities between residents and non-residents.
b 1982.
Source: BIS 1992
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The emergence of an increasingly dense network of regulatory interstate collabora-
tion is the second important feature of internationalized securities markets. Col-
laboration entails negotiations on the harmonization of supervisory standards
and on cross-border contacts between domestic regulatory bodies aimed at moni-
toring and enforcing rules. Interstate cooperation is practised on the bilateral as
well as at the multilateral level. Bilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs)
between domestic regulatory agencies have until recently been the predominant
form of regulatory coordination in the securities sector. MOUs tend to be highly
Table 2 The Size and Growth of Institutional Investors
OECD Region
Compound average annual rate of growth Total assets out-
standing at end 1991
in billion US $
Life Insurance Companies
Europea 15 9 22 1,200
North America 12 12 11 1,700
Japan 24 25 22 1,100
Total 15 14 17 4,000
Pension Funds
Europea 15 17 13 1,300
North America 16 18 13 3,300
Japan 23 26 19 300
Total 16 18 14 4,900
Investment Funds
Europea 25 31 19 1,000
North America 19 24 14 1,400
Japan 26 44 10 300
Total 22 28 15 2,700
Growth of All Institutional Investors
Europea 17 17 17 3,500
North America 15 17 13 6,400
Japan 24 29 19 1,800
Total 17 18 15 11,700
a The ten European countries taken into account are: Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
Source: OECD 1995c
1981–19861981–1991 1986–1991
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technical and fix the rights and duties involved in the exchange of information
between different regulatory bodies. They also provide for mutual assistance in
the investigation of securities law violations.
Multilateral coordination on matters of securities regulation took place at the
level of the European Union whose “Single Market Programme” of 1985 consid-
erably pushed the integration of European capital markets. Particularly the di-
rectives on “Insider Trading” (89/592/EEC of November 13, 1989) and on “Invest-
ment Services” (93/22/EEC of May 10, 1993) aimed at generating a network of
collaboration between regulatory bodies of the member states. Both directives
link the creation of a Single European Market for securities with the principle of
home country control.6 That is, they require member states to specify a supervisory
body for the securities sector, which would then cooperate closely with its foreign
counterparts. Further coordination takes place in the International Organization
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), an international regime of national regula-
tory bodies (see for the IOSCO: Coleman/Underhill 1995; Porter 1993; IOSCO
1994). IOSCO was founded in 1974, first as an inter-American organization, and
in 1984 reorganized into an international body, representing domestic securities
and exchange commissions. During the 1980s, IOSCO was transformed more and
more into a global platform for coordinating and harmonizing regulatory stan-
dards.
In the mid-1980s, both structural changes sketched out above created pressures to
reorganize domestic systems of sectoral governance. Starting with the United
States, a worldwide process of domestic financial marketplace restructuring was
set in motion (for an overview see Moran 1991, Coleman 1996, Laurence 1996).
Reorganization partly aimed at modernising stock exchange trading, for example
by using electronic trading systems and by offering an array of new product in-
novations, and was therefore closely linked to the deregulatory efforts mentioned
above. It was not only the market itself which was the object of reorganization.
The regulatory framework in which market activities were embedded also un-
derwent profound transformation. Probably the most distinct feature of the fi-
nancial services revolution was that liberalization of market activities was ac-
companied by a tightening of the rules of investor protection (see on the general
point of freer markets and tighter rules: S. Vogel 1996). Systems of stock exchange
governance underwent in a large number of industrialised countries a process of
“institutionalization, codification and formalization” of rules (Moran 1991) to-
gether with a strengthened role of the state. Either regulatory tasks were dele-
                                                  
6 This principle is common in the field of financial regulation; it was used in interna-
tional agreements on banking issues both by the Basle Committee and the EU-
Commission (see Kapstein 1994).
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gated to newly founded independent agencies like the Commission des Bourses
(COB) in France, or regulatory activities were increasingly embedded in public
law as in Britain.
In this process of sectoral reorganization, the United States played a crucial, even
hegemonic role.7 Hegemony refers in this case to the coupling of market-power
and political power in the international arena (see also Strange 1986 for the lead-
ership of the US in international finance). Market power arises from the fact that
the largest institutional investors, actors who have turned into the major players
on international securities markets, are located in the United States. Between 1955
and 1975, institutions became major shareholders of securities on the New York
Stock Exchange and used their position of structural power to erode the former
price cartel of domestic investment firms by claiming discount prices for the
trading of large blocs of shares. Moreover, crises following from the breach of
trading rules and substantial losses of investors led to a debate about the short-
comings of the existing system. In the 1970s, insider trading became an issue of
the regulatory debate and, in the mid-1980s, a campaign against insider-dealing
led to enlarged supervisory powers for the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) over domestic stock exchanges (Moran 1991). With their size and impor-
tance steadily increasing, American investors were able to extend their influence
over foreign countries. Since they are considered to be most the most attractive
customers, their wishes drive the strategies of foreign producers and regulators
(see Laurence 1996 who argues that “mobile” consumers are the general benefi-
ciaries of regulatory reforms in finance).
The political power of the US derived primarily from the power of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), which is considered to be the world’s most
reputable “watchdog” organization in securities markets. The power of the SEC
is due not only to the fact that it is the oldest regulatory agency in the securities
sector, but also because its mission is focused on the protection of investors. The
SEC upholds a regulatory model that is seen as the most investor-oriented one in
the world. Given the fact that this model imposes the highest costs in terms of
disclosure rules and transparency standards on its domestic producers, the SEC
has a strong interest in exporting it. Under conditions of increasingly interna-
tionalized markets, high regulatory standards could have turned into competitive
disadvantages for US investment companies. This was exactly the reason why the
SEC began working on the expansion of collaboration between domestic regula-
tory agencies at the beginning of the 1980s. It was especially the instrument of
                                                  
7 In contrast to Laurence (1996), Moran (1991) has clearly shown an active role of the
US in the process of sectoral restructuring, and the German case will prove a further
example of this.
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bilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) that the SEC used to export its
regulatory model abroad. The core of these bilateral contracts is to ensure recipro-
cal assistance from the foreign regulatory agency in cases of cross-border fraud. This
could entail, for instance, conducting investigations at the request of foreign
agencies or to obtain documentary evidence from abroad. This kind of reciprocal
exchange between two international watchdogs, however, is much easier if both
are public authorities with the same competences and the same kind of autonomy
from their market constituencies. If, for instance, a foreign financial firm has vio-
lated a domestic securities law, the domestic regulatory body can ask its foreign
counterpart for “legal assistance.” This can often create significant problems in
the absence of a public regulatory body: private associations, for example, could
have great difficulty in lifting the domestic bank secrecy veil. In turn, reciprocal
exchange between regulatory bodies also demands that information obtained is
kept secret. A private agency such as a banking association with self-regulatory
powers appears to be a less trustworthy partner in exchanges of business secrets
since these could be leaked to the association’s members. Thus, signing a MOU
with the SEC imposes, more or less, direct pressures on the foreign counterpart to
level its domestic system of sectoral supervision in line with US standards. Start-
ing with Switzerland in 1982, Great Britain and Japan in 1986, the Canadian
Provinces and Brazil in 1988, the Netherlands in 1989, and France and Italy in
1991, the SEC had signed as many as 20 MOUs worldwide by 1994. In almost all
of these countries, MOUs with the SEC either preceded the establishment of new
public regulatory agencies or followed shortly afterwards (see Moran 1991: 118
for the SEC’s role in promoting the re-regulation of the Japanese financial market,
and see Smith 1988, Bernhard/Blumrosen 1993, Baumgardner 1990, US SEC 1994
for MOUs in general).8
Taken together, US market and political actors were strong allies in matters of in-
vestor protection. The linkage of investors’ market power and of the SEC’s capac-
ity to create a regulatory model for investor protection worthy of imitation by
other countries was the key force in this regulatory “race to the top.”9
                                                  
8 Nadelmann (1993) has argued that the SEC’s strategy was part of a broader interna-
tionalization of US criminal law enforcement during the last five decades. The US
has played a central role in the evolution of a transnational police community by
advocating intense and systematic international collaboration, training thousands of
foreign police officials, making its computerized data bases available to foreign in-
vestigators and by initiating new endeavours in criminal legislation (Nadelmann
1993: 187).
9 See Stephen Vogel (1996: 36–37) for different strategies of the US in promoting
regulatory reforms abroad and the FAZ of October 11, 1996: 33 for the view of Ger-
man banks towards the SEC as vanguard of foreign regulatory change. David Vogel
has characterized this process as the“California effect”: regulatory competition can
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Germany was the definite laggard in this process and joined the bandwagon of
modernization and re-regulation at the end of the 1980s. Nevertheless, the Ger-
man case demonstrates very clearly the pressures faced by domestic actors when
they become aware of the changing international landscape in finance. German
large universal banks, traditionally more reliant on commercial lending than in-
vestment banking, realized that they had to catch up with international competi-
tion. Hence, at the international level, they stepped up their offensive in invest-
ment banking towards the end of 1989: all German banks acquired or established
new investment banking houses in London, the most attractive financial mar-
ketplace in Europe. The Deutsche Bank, for instance, paid 950 million pounds
sterling to acquire Morgan Grenfell, one of the most reputable investment banks
in the world (Financial Times of May 29, 1996: VI).
At the domestic level, German banks engaged in the reorganization of their home
market. By international standards, the German financial marketplace was seen
as underdeveloped; market capitalization was only a tenth of that in the United
States, although the US economy is only three times as large (Financial Times of
May 29, 1996: I; see table 3).
Because market demand at home was so weak, banks attempted to attract foreign
investors to the domestic stock market in order to catch up with competitors. But
                                                  
promote a regulatory “race to the top” if the country which exports the high regula-
tory standard is of considerable size and has a large domestic market. The trading
partners are then forced to meet those standards in order to maintain or to widen
their own export markets. It is for this reason that both globally and within North
America the California effect has occurred primarily through the influence of the
United States (Vogel 1995: 6). See also Genschel/Plümper (1996) for the study of the
different logics of “races to the top” and “races to the bottom.”
Table 3 Stock Market Indicators, 1994
Number of Domestic
Listed Firms
Market Value
(in billions)
Market Value
(as % of GDP)
Germany 666 773.9 DM 23.3%
UK 1803 1806.0 DM 111.7%
Japana 2205 371024 ¥ 79.1%
USAb 7525 5051.6 $ 75.0%
a The figure for Japan represents the total number of firms listed on the Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya ex-
changes. These figures circumvent the double-counting of firms listed on both exchanges.
b The figures for the United States represent totals from the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock
Exchange and NASDAQ combined.
Source: Arbeitsgemeinschaft der deutschen Wertpapierbörsen, Tokyo Stock Exchange Fact Book, New York
Stock Exchange, AMEX and NASDAQ
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multinational customers like insurance companies, mutual funds or pension
funds were now able to choose their trading places on the global scale and, in
fact, they did not choose the German marketplace. Ironically, they did not even
need to choose the German marketplace in order to invest in German shares – in
1990, the trading of the most liquid German shares at the London Stock Exchange
accounted for about 13% of their turnover on the domestic market. Financial fu-
tures exchanges in London and Paris began offering DM-contracts, and “Deutsch-
mark securities markets” grew outside Germany, with the centre of the Euro-
DM-market being in London, followed by Luxembourg and Paris.
Different reasons for this lack of foreign investor interest in the German market
have been cited: first, the costs of stock market transactions (i.e. turnover taxes,
brokers’ commissions, costs for clearing and settling deals) were relatively high
while product innovations offering risk-management opportunities were lacking
in Germany. Second, and more important in its structural implications for the
German system of sectoral governance, the German model of self-regulation
came increasingly under pressure. Given the opaqueness of the self-regulated
system, investors argued, one could trust neither the soundness of price-setting
nor the willingness of self-regulatory monitors to sanction market malpractices.
Moreover, when German banks invented new products and tried to sell them to
foreign investors, they were blocked by regulatory bodies. Member firms of the
German Options and Futures Exchange (Deutsche Terminbörse, DTB) were eager
to sell their latest financial innovations (i.e. options on the index of the most liq-
uid German stocks) to US-based finance houses and money managers. The US Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, however, prohibited trading of these prod-
ucts in the United States by arguing that they came from a market which oper-
ated under lower regulatory standards than that of the US. Since the protection of
domestic investors was seen to be the SEC’s primary mission, the agency pushed
foreign market actors to guarantee US investors the same level of protection they
enjoyed at home. The same happened when the German DTB together with the
Frankfurt Exchange sought to set up computer terminals with their German elec-
tronic trading system “IBIS” on the trading floors of the London and Paris Stock
Exchanges. Foreign investors would have been able to trade in German products
on the German market by using the German trading system. Both exchanges denied
this access by referring to the “lower regulatory standard” of the German market.
Although German banks still maintained that their model of self-regulation
worked, they nonetheless were confronted with the reality that this model had
become a major liability in the global competition for investors and that it was
being used by foreign states to protect their markets against potential German
competition. In order to participate in the global game, it became clearly neces-
sary to prove one’s fairness and honesty as producers of financial services by op-
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erating in a tightly regulated market under close state supervision. A high regula-
tory standard was now considered a “seal of quality” (Interview 950428) pushing
the domestic market up in the global ranking scheme. All at once, German banks
had an interest in “bringing the state back in” to their regulatory setting. This has
become a significant goal, especially since 1990.
Up to this point, it is clear that it has been primarily market forces, stemming from
structural changes in international securities markets that have driven the process
of sectoral transformation in Germany. However, regulatory change would not
have taken place without the involvement of the German state and, in fact, it was
political forces, growing out of the multi-layered system of interstate relations, that
pushed for a stronger role for the German state in sectoral regulation. The Federal
Ministry of Finance had for a long time played a passive role in the process of sec-
toral restructuring simply because it upheld the model of self-regulation together
with the banks more or less up to 1989. Nevertheless, the main problem the Fed-
eral Ministry faced, probably since the mid-1980s, was meeting the standards of
interstate collaboration which evolved around issues of securities regulation. As I
mentioned earlier, interstate collaboration on regulatory politics evolved both on
the bilateral and at the multilateral level – Germany was able to carry out neither
the first nor the latter task.
In terms of bilateral collaboration, a circle of bilateral exchanges had been devel-
oped up to the 1990s, from which Germany was excluded. In 1988, the SEC con-
tacted Germany and applied for assistance in the prosecution of two cases of in-
sider-dealing in which, apparently, German firms had been involved. Since Ger-
many had no legal procedure for cross-border investigations of this kind, it was
unable to meet the request for collaboration.
Similar collaboration failures also occurred at the multilateral level. As has been
mentioned before, the EU Single Market Programme and particularly the direc-
tives on “Insider Trading” (1989) and on “Investment Services” (1993) considera-
bly pushed the process of re-regulation towards a more investor-oriented model
in securities regulation. Within the European Union, it was mostly Great Britain,
the country with the second largest securities market in the world, that joined the
bandwagon towards liberalization and reregulation of its stock exchange market,
which had been set in motion by the United States in 1975. At the European level,
Germany was in a minority position for different reasons: first, it had tried to
block the passing of the legendary “Insider Directive.” This directive had finally
brought the criminalization of insider trading and other forms of market mal-
practices. Member states were required to designate domestic bodies that would
be responsible for the supervision and enforcement of insider-laws, disclosure
rules and rules of conduct. The history of this directive dates back to 1976 when
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DG 15 of the European Commission set up a task force of national stock exchange
experts to sketch out a draft version. Since some of the member states, among
them Germany, were quite reluctant to pursue this policy, only incremental prog-
ress was made. In May 1988, when the majority of other member states had either
undertaken legislative action to ban insider trading or were prepared to do so,
the German government, joined by the Federal Council and the financial associa-
tions, still rejected legislation in matters of insider trading (Bundestagsdruck-
sache 11/2358 of May 24, 1988). Consequently, in July 1989, Germany was iso-
lated at the European level and faced the very likely scenario of being overruled
when the directive was examined in the Council of Ministers. However, the key
domestic actors were not willing to pay this price because they feared a further
loss in the reputation of their national financial marketplace.
But even after these directives were passed, Germany was not prepared to im-
plement them. As has been mentioned already, both directives required member
states to determine domestic supervisory agencies for the securities sector who
would be willing to collaborate closely with their foreign partners. However, the
directives did not require these domestic agencies to be public bodies, but mem-
ber states were asked to guarantee that these agencies could provide legal assis-
tance and keep official secrets vis-à-vis third parties. Thus, the growing interstate
collaboration in matters of monitoring and enforcement of securities law imposed
indirect pressures on domestic partners to institutionally adjust their systems of
sectoral governance to international standards.
Finally, additional pressures, deriving from Germany’s membership in the Inter-
national Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) drove the Germans to
adapt to the international regulatory standard. Since 1984, IOSCO has been the
most important international organization representing national securities and
exchange commissions. In contrast to the Basle Committee, its counterpart in in-
ternational banking regulation, IOSCO is larger (115 members in 1994) and inter-
nally more formalized. There is a hierarchy in the governing committee structure
and in the status of members. The core decision-making processes within this or-
ganization take place in the “Executive” and the “Technical Committee,” both of
which are composed only of members of the world’s largest and most important
securities markets. The range of possible kinds of membership covers regular, as-
sociated and affiliated members, partly ranked according to their public or pri-
vate status. Private bodies such as stock exchanges could themselves be members
of IOSCO, but as affiliate members they have not been allowed to vote and have
been excluded from participation in the two central committees. Germany joined
IOSCO in 1988, but was excluded from decision-making because it was repre-
sented by the Federation of the German Stock Exchanges. In 1990, the Federal
Ministry was asked to take over membership of IOSCO, but lacked the technical
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expertise for dealing with the details of securities’ regulation. German represen-
tatives once more found themselves in a situation “where we were not able to
collaborate” (Interview 950428).
5 The New Model of Sectoral Governance – Towards Further
Centralization of the System
Faced either with an obvious loss of business or with a loss of political reputation,
German economic and political actors launched a process of sectoral reorganiza-
tion very much determined by the standards of foreign investors.
Given the fact that institutional investors are sensitive towards product innova-
tions and towards the transaction costs of their dealing operations, German banks
engaged in rationalizing market transactions and in integrating the organization
of clearing and settlement facilities together with trading in the most liquid
shares. In order to better control this process, the three big universal banks
(Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank) and the central bank of the
savings banks sector, the Deutsche Girozentrale (DGZ) – all of which members of
the board of the Frankfurt Exchange – pushed for a centralization of decision-
making structures in the Federation of Stock Exchanges. Majority voting was to
replace unanimity ruling and a new voting system would be constituted depend-
ing on each exchange’s percentage share of the general stock market turnover.
According to this new rule, Frankfurt and Düsseldorf together held 80 votes
while the other 6 exchanges together only had 20. A new manager of the working
group was appointed, who was at the same time a board member of the Frank-
furt exchange as well as a representative of the Deutsche Bank. The Federation
was renamed “Arbeitsgemeinschaft der deutschen Wertpapierbörsen” (Consor-
tium of German Stock Exchanges) and given a new mandate for external lobby-
ing while internally coordinating the introduction of product innovations and the
restructuring of the common infrastructure (clearing and settlement systems, use
of electronic trading systems; Müller 1986; Röller 1986).
Obviously, the former state of friendly coexistence between the different regional
partners was no longer tolerated by the large banks, and within the circle a
Frankfurt-based coalition crystallized, now using its market power in order to re-
structure the German financial marketplace according to its interests. Starting
with the foundation of the German Futures and Options Exchange (Deutsche Ter-
minbörse, DTB) in 1990, this coalition launched further steps towards sectoral
centralization. The formation of this exchange not only meant the introduction of
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product innovations in Germany since it reintroduced derivatives trading, but it
was the first fully computerized national exchange in Germany and therefore
broke with the regional principle of stock exchange organization. In order to raise
capital for the process of restructuring, the large banks founded the Deutsche
Börse AG, a common joint-stock company in 1991. The firm should act as an um-
brella organization for all German exchanges and in particular centralize the
clearing and settlement facilities needed by the other exchanges. Struggles be-
tween the Frankfurt coalition and the regionally oriented actors preceded the
formation of the new organization since Frankfurt first proposed that not the re-
gional exchanges but their member firms should become shareholders of the new
joint company (Deutsche Sparkassenzeitung of June 11, 1991: 1). However, the
votes of the regional partners were needed for the planned reorganization and
that is why Frankfurt offered the seven regional exchanges a 10% ownership
share (Deutsche Sparkassenzeitung of November 11, 1991: 3). This was definitely
not a great deal for them, but, together with regional banks and brokers who held
a further 22% of the firm’s capital, they hoped at least to form a strong minority
among the shareholders able to veto decision-making procedures (Interview 950323).
Hence, resistance against Frankfurt would have required considerable collective
action among the regional actors, and the further history of the German stock
market development revealed that this capacity was increasingly declining. In the
meantime, the Frankfurt coalition has not only become stronger but also broader,
and includes today Düsseldorf and Munich as the next larger exchanges as well
as Berlin, the exchange of the German capital. From the viewpoint of Frankfurt,
these partners represent the dedicated survivors of its new project of replacing
floor trading by electronic trading by the end of this century. This project is part
of the Deutsche Börse’s new strategic scenario, announced in May 1995 as the
“ZEUS concept,” to reorganize itself into a finance company, offering a broad
range of services around the equities business (see for example Handelsblatt of
May 31, 1995: 1). Of crucial importance for the future of the smaller exchanges
was that the four partners decided to share a common order book, in which
trading of the most attractive 100 DAX-shares was divided between the four of
them, with Frankfurt getting the first 30 equities. Regarding those equities which
are not part of the first 100, but nevertheless traded at more than one exchange,
issuers and related banks were to be persuaded to trade these papers only at one
of these four exchanges (Handelsblatt of November 27, 1995: 1).
It is obvious that the smaller, regionally oriented actors are the likely losers in this
distributional conflict. Smaller exchanges cannot completely rely on their regional
niches but need to trade some of the attractive shares in order to survive. Fur-
thermore, strong coalition partners, able to resist the pressures towards centrali-
zation, are lacking. The future of brokers is unclear, too, since electronic trading
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would more or less displace stockbrokers and their official function of price-
fixing. Only capitalized brokers will be able to survive and will need to reorgan-
ize into American style investment houses.10 The German Länder governments
(except Hessen) are eager to express their political will to preserve a federal stock
exchange market (Handelsblatt of March 13, 1996: 37). They fear losing regional
and also larger businesses who presently hold up their regional exchanges.
Smaller investors and issuers would lose access to an important source of capital
since they would find it too expensive to access the centralized Frankfurt Ex-
change (Coleman 1996: 141). Nevertheless the Länder are unwilling to intervene
and have declared the future of the regional structure to be a “question only the
market itself will decide.” Given the power differentials on this market, further
monopolization of trading will be the likely outcome of this decision.
In sum, the centralization of the market structure clearly revealed that the large
banks, those actors who had hitherto supported the regional cartel system, lost
their incentives for upholding it. The costs and gains of share dealing were no
longer defined on the home market, but on the global one. Thus, from the view-
point of global players, arrangements seeking to distribute costs and gains among
the circle of domestic market players were becoming obsolete, particularly if they
imposed the costs of collaboration on the actors that had become the object of
global competition: the investors. The global guideline for restructuring of mar-
kets was to minimize transaction costs of equity dealing, a strategy which no
longer left room for “interorganizational slack,” that is for subsidizing weaker
partners at home. Therefore, increasing heterogeneity of interests among the
group of market players slowly eroded former preconditions of collective action.
Meeting standards of international competitiveness, however, required more
than simple market restructuring. From the viewpoint of the major German
banks, the regulatory framework of stock market trading had also turned into a criti-
cal factor determining the international ranking of the domestic financial mar-
ketplace. This was exactly the point where market actors had to rely on the state
and worked on “bringing it in” to the system of sectoral supervision. Additional
pressures on the Federal Ministry of Finance came from the supranational level
since the approval of the EU-directives on “Insider Trading” and “Investment Serv-
ices” required participation in the establishment of a collaborative network of do-
mestic regulatory bodies. In January 1992, Finance Minister Waigel presented a pol-
                                                  
10 Frankfurt’s Chamber of Stockbrokers was recently reorganized into a joint-stock
company. From the viewpoint of its members this should allow it to better influence
the policy of the Deutsche Börse and to “have a stronger voice” in disputes about the
reorganization of the Finanzplatz Deutschland (“German financial market place,”
FAZ of January 25, 1996: 20).
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icy paper in which further support for the “Finanzplatz Deutschland” concept
was announced (Der Bundesminister der Finanzen 1992). The paper noted the
need for a new market supervisory body located at the federal level and for fur-
ther regulations protecting against insider trading and providing equal treatment
of shareholders. Furthermore, the Ministry declared its willingness to moderate
the forthcoming decision-making procedures. This paper was basically the out-
come of consultation with members of the Commission of Experts for Stock Ex-
change Matters (Börsensachverständigenkommission), an advisory body of the Min-
istry, representing banks, banking associations, politicians and related academics.
These actors formed the core of a new coalition of “globally oriented” players that
placed the need to meet international standards of regulation at the centre of the
debate. They were joined by the state government of Hessen, which from the be-
ginning of the “Finanzplatz Deutschland” discussion had promoted the position
of the Frankfurt-centred banks and voted for a federal solution to the supervisory
problem, modelled on the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.
Similar to the collapse of the economic cartel, the formerly stable political cartel of
the German states and market actors, united in defending their sphere of compe-
tence against federal intervention, eroded as well.
Nevertheless, the German system of federalism allows the German states to veto
decision-making processes in matters listed under Art. 74 of the German Basic
Law. Indeed, it was their codecision rights in stock exchange Legislation that
permitted them to decide on the passing of the new law, known as the “2. Finanz-
marktförderungsgesetz” (Second Financial Market Promotion Law). This was
their most powerful resource in the forthcoming negotiations. In fact, the creation
of new regulatory competences for the federal level provoked a new confronta-
tion as the Länder feared the loss of their own historical jurisdiction in the area.
The Länder proposed the setting-up of a common supervisory agency. Not
suprisingly, this proposal was met with resistance from the global coalition,
which feared that an agency carried by a “conglomerate of German states” would
lack clear international visibility and would not meet the requirements of inter-
state collaboration. Structural changes in the international market environment
supported the position of the global players. At the same time, a compromise was
needed since the states could use their codecision rights in matters of stock ex-
change legislation to veto upcoming federal legislation aimed at creating a fed-
eral supervisory body. In January 1992, a common working group of federal and
Länder representatives was constituted (Bund-Länder-Arbeitskreis) in order to draft
a compromise. Turf battles lasted for almost a full year, and finally it was the
Federal Ministry which came out the winner in this conflict.
A new regulatory model was decided upon, the crux of which was a supervisory
agency for securities trading under the jurisdiction of the Bundesaufsichtsamt für
den Wertpapierhandel (Federal Ministry of Finance). Its tasks involve the surveil-
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lance of large share transactions and rules of conduct in securities trading.
Moreover, the agency enforces a strict regime controlling insider trading and, in
particular, represents Germany in international circles of securities regulation.
Although the German Länder did not achieve their original objective, they re-
tained some regulatory responsibilities. Their supervision of their respective se-
curities exchanges was expanded, a new Wertpapierrat (Securities Council) was
founded, which was almost identical with the existing working group of states
and intended to provide advice, but not participate, in decision-making. The
stock exchanges themselves lost power since formerly self-regulated matters be-
came the subject of federal supervision or were regulated in public law. Never-
theless, the exchanges were asked to set up a new body for supervising stock ex-
change trading (Handelsüberwachungsstelle) whose task was to collect data elec-
tronically on market transactions and collaborate closely with the Federal agency.
In general, a complex regulatory structure evolved which reflects the kind of
“interlocking politics” characteristic of the German model of federalism (Scharpf
et al. 1976). So far, it is not completely clear where the responsibilities of the three
levels of regulation end or whether they overlap. Regulatory practice has shown
that direct contacts between the federal level and the stock exchange level prevail
while, at least in some German Länder, regulatory supervision is more of a sym-
bolic character. And given the likely scenario that share dealing will be concen-
trated at four places or even monopolized in Frankfurt, there is little reason for
preserving the regulatory duties of all the states.
Seen as a whole, a new regulatory model of stock exchange regulation has been
set up, in which the regulation of market malpractices under the supervision of
the federal government plays a distinct role. Obviously, actors have shifted
regulation towards a more investor-oriented model, stressing customers’ rights of
information and transparency where market transactions are concerned. Profes-
sional norms and informal rules are increasingly substituted by rules that are
embedded in public law. Although this model imposed additional costs on the
producers, they have had no other choice finally but to join the international
bandwagon and push for it as well. High standards of investor protection have
turned into a matter of international competitiveness since the quality of prod-
ucts is now measured according to the regulatory framework in which “produc-
tion” is embedded. Public participation in the system of sectoral supervision has
become a critical factor that allows access to new foreign markets. Shortly after
the new supervisory body began its work in January 1995, for instance, members
of the German Options and Futures Exchange were allowed to promote and to
sell their latest financial innovation (= Future Contract on the DAX) to US-based
firms (FT of January 1, 1995, 15). In March 1996, Germany was permitted to set up
computer terminals with the German electronic trading system in the United
States (Handelsblatt of March 3, 1996: 33).
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The German federal government, on the other hand, did not participate actively
in the first stages of sectoral reorganization. But once it faced a threatening loss of
reputation and of influence over the policies of securities regulation at the inter-
national level, it decided to take the initiative and push for a larger role of the
federal state in the regulatory setting. In fact, political actors were even “reward-
ed” for adjusting institutionally to global standards: in January 1995, the recently
established German supervisory body took up membership of IOSCO, and a
couple of weeks later, Germany assumed the vice-chair of the Technical Commit-
tee. In addition, several cooperative agreements were signed between the Ger-
man supervisory office and foreign regulatory counterparts, the first among them
being those with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Com-
modities Futures Trading Commission of the US.
6 The Revival of the Nation-State?
Financial internationalization, driven by structural market changes and accom-
panied by increasing interstate collaboration in matters of securities regulation,
has in fact provoked structural shifts in the architecture of domestic governance
systems. Apparently, the nation-state has gained new competences in the model
of sectoral supervision, which derive from two sources: from the inability of market
actors to regulate themselves and from the strength of the international system of states
that imposes new duties on its members.
First of all, it has become obvious that traditional and historically evolved sys-
tems of self-regulation by market actors suffered from internal erosion due to new
competitive pressures. The former cartel-like arrangement between market actors
that had provided room for subsidizing the weaker partners of the circle relied on
the fact that its costs could be shifted to the customer, that is the investor, side.
Under conditions of increasingly internationalized markets, however, this condi-
tion was no longer given since investors had become the most attractive object of
international competition. Thus, the larger banks which had hitherto upheld the
former cartel lost the incentive to support it. From their perspective as self-
defined global players, domestic cartels were now seen as a major liability in in-
ternational competition and had to be replaced by a market structure which of-
fered investors the lowest possible costs of market transactions. Weaker partners,
among them smaller exchanges, stockbrokers and regionally oriented banks, are
the likely losers of a strategy of sectoral reorganization that centralizes stock
market trading according to global standards.
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Probably more important than the internal pressures of erosion, however, are the
external forces that undermined the former domestic model of sectoral self-
regulation. Even if cartel-like relations had continued to exist, it is questionable
whether the old regulatory model could have survived. The reason for this is simply
that self-regulation had lost legitimacy as a governance mechanism at the global
level, mainly because structural changes in international securities markets went
hand-in-hand with changing power relations between the producers of financial
services and the investors of financial assets. Securitization and the rise of insti-
tutional investors made it likely that those who profited most from higher regula-
tory standards would be able to push for an investor-oriented regime of protec-
tion. A regulatory model based on “tacit rules” and trust-like relations among
producers was not tolerated by foreign institutional investors, who were neither
part of it nor able to understand its rules. Conversely, non-transparency raised
suspicions of collusion and the misbehaviour of financial intermediaries. In the
view of investors, self-regulation was obviously no longer an appropriate gov-
ernance mechanism that could prove the fairness and honesty of financial pro-
ducers in particular, and the safety and soundness of market transactions in gen-
eral. Moreover, a system of increasingly integrated domestic securities markets,
governed by different models of self-imposed rules, would have incumbered in-
vestors with considerable “learning” costs: as multinationals operating more or
less decoupled from territory, time and personal relationships with financial in-
termediaries, customers were unwilling to familiarize themselves with all the dif-
ferent types of self-created systems of investor protection. Thus, for reasons
partly to do with the credibility of market regulation and with lowering the costs
of market transactions, market actors were interested in harmonizing the rules of
the market game and in delegating supervision of them to the state, whose le-
gitimacy as monopolist of violence has not yet been questioned.11
The second source of increased competences of the nation-state was, quite ironi-
cally, the increasing interdependence with its foreign counterparts and, in particular,
the growing network of interstate collaboration. However, it is important to note
first that the nation-state has in fact lost autonomy in the formulation of regulatory
policies towards its market constituencies. We have seen very clearly that states
are increasingly engaging in processes of “regulatory competition,” i.e. for the
most attractive and mobile investors. The type and level of market regulation,
                                                  
11 One could therefore argue that new supervisory powers for the state were nothing
but “capture” (Stigler) of it by the global market players. However, German banks
were also willing to engage in costly and time-consuming duties to report their
share transactions to the newly founded agency and carry 90% of the operation costs
of the supervisory body – expenses only incurred for the sake of international com-
petitiveness.
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therefore, turns into a crucial asset that more than ever determines the ranking of
the domestic territory in the system of increasingly integrated securities markets.
Since its policies are measured according to their contribution to international
competitiveness, the state is no longer sovereign in the choice of its policies. The
market itself defines the quality of public policies. Moreover, the case has demon-
strated very clearly that regulatory policies are formulated and negotiated in sys-
tems of bilateral and multilateral collaboration, both of governments and of spe-
cialized public regulatory agencies. Nation-states are in fact mere “negotiation
partners” in the international arena, and are therefore forced to engage in com-
promises and to often accept second-best solutions.
However, international regimes have their limits as well, and the case has shown
that the monitoring and enforcement of negotiated rules is a task that both the
European Union and specialized regulatory regimes like the Basle Committee
prefer to delegate back to their member states. It is exactly the newly delegated
function of market supervision that the state’s new task is all about. Nevertheless,
reciprocal exchanges, i.e. of information or of legal assistance within the interna-
tional circle of regulatory bodies, impose certain demands on the members of the
exchange. Information on market constituencies can be gathered and exchanged
much easier if the exchange partner is a public agency, enjoying at least formally
more autonomy from the objects of supervision than a private association for in-
stance. Moreover, “legal assistance” in cases of, say, cross-border fraud implies
that the exchange partners can rely on legal procedures for the prosecution of in-
sider-dealing and therefore make use of resources only states possess. In other
words: equality within international networks of securities regulation presup-
poses similar competences on the part of the collaboration partners at home.
New tasks of market supervision have obviously also shifted the internal balance
of power, i.e. power among different levels of the nation-state as well. In general,
we can observe that the federal state gains power vis-à-vis the state level because
it serves as a pivot for the international community of financial market regula-
tors, where regulatory frameworks are harmonized and the international playing
field is negotiated (see also Hirst/Thompson 1996 for the notion of nation-states
as components of an international “polity”). In addition to this “disequilibration”
of the former stable model of power sharing within the federalist system (see
Deeg/Lütz 1996 for the implication of financial internationalization on federalist
states), a second dimension of this power shift has crystallized as well. Increased
competences on the part of the federal government have come with the estab-
lishment of specialized agencies within the executive branch of the state. These
supervisory bodies, either operating under the jurisdiction of the federal state as
in Germany or via independent regulatory agencies in the style of the US, are at
the core of the new state functions and, as Majone has argued in the EU context,
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they indicate the changing nature of state-society relations (Majone 1993: 30). In
order to fulfil credibly the task of market supervision, they require a certain
autonomy both from parliament and from the central administration. Since they
are staffed with trained professionals, in the German case both from the market
and the administrative side, a technocratic view on regulatory politics is very
likely. Traditional channels of legitimized political power are apparently losing
importance while specialized parts of the political administration are extending
their autonomy, i.e. by engaging in worldwide coalition-building with their for-
eign counterparts. The state is no longer a unitary actor, but its parts most in
touch with the global economy are increasingly leading “a life of their own.”
Taken together, how can we qualify the relationship of states and markets against
the background of pervasive blurring of territorial boundaries? Internationaliza-
tion has redefined the role of the nation-state as manager of the national econ-
omy. That the chances of Keynesian fine-tuning of economic policies have been
considerably reduced by highly mobile capital does not mean a return to a pure
market economy. Even securities markets, seen as the most fluid and mobile
segments of financial capital, have to be organized. Property rights have to be
guaranteed and rules have to be set and monitored – tasks which obviously can-
not be fulfilled by market participants themselves (Boyer 1996: 110). It is most
apparent that the widening of market boundaries requires a set of agreed or im-
posed rules of the game, there is no spontaneous implementation of market
mechanisms (see also Underhill 1991 for the importance of “politics” for the ex-
pansion of financial markets). The state is therefore back again by ensuring
transparency, fairness and access of markets through legal penalties for non-
compliance (Boyer/Drache 1996: 3). States and markets are increasingly depend-
ent on each other because the discipline of the market and the rule of money is
enforced by the rule of law. In this sense, the new state functions resemble very
much the functions provided by the liberal state of the mid-19th century (Panitch
1996: 95). As “competition state” (Cerny 1993) the state of the late 20th century
allies de facto with those political and market actors that profit most from the
territorial expansion of markets, thereby forming new coalitions of globally ori-
ented players at different political levels, while the potential losers are obviously
left behind. The nation-state is brought back in to support and not to withstand
the worldwide integration of capital markets.
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